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Abstract 
The subsidiarity principle governing the collection of statistical data in the EMU may cause asymmetrical information. 
The national governments may be tempted to distort their economic and financial data communicated to ECB in order 
to influence its monetary policy decisions. We base our analysis on a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary 
Union and we prove that the governments' incentives to modify their private information depend mainly on the nature 
of the asymmetrical information between the Union's policy-makers, on the degree of monetary activism and on the 
extent of structural heterogeneity between the Union's members.
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     1. Introduction 
Since the creation of the Euro zone, the question of the policy-mix has been discussed 
according  to  two  main  issues.  The  first  one  is  an  issue  of  credibility  concerning  the 
combination  of  the  economic  policies  and  involves  possible  discrepancies  relative  to 
macroeconomic objectives between the national governments and the single Central Bank
1. 
The second issue is concerned with the macroeconomic stabilization against the different 
types  of  shocks  that  can  affect  the  economies  of  the  member  countries  in  a  specific 
institutional  context,  which  is  that  of  the  independence  of  the  ECB  and  of  the  fiscal 
constraints imposed on the governments by the Stability and Growth Pact
2. 
These two major issues trigger another problematic aspect specific to the EMU, which is 
the asymmetrical information that may appear between the policy-makers and thus influence 
the organization of the policy-mix. A type of asymmetrical information specific to the EMU 
relies on the fact that the governments can have private information about their economic 
shocks which they may choose either to hide or to transmit in a deformed manner to the other 
governments  and  to  the  Central  Bank  in  order  to  enhance  their  individual  welfare.  This 
asymmetrical  information  can  be  accounted  for  by  two  major  aspects  of  the  current 
organization of the EMU. Firstly, the governments have a certain influence on the national 
statistical  information.  Indeed,  despite  the  measures  of  control  and  harmonisation,  the 
statistical data are essentially collected by the national institutes
3. Secondly, when deciding 
on  the  single  monetary  policy,  the  ECB  takes  into  account  the  aggregate  values  of 
macroeconomic  variables  at  the  level  of  the  entire  Euro  zone,  which  can  even  more 
encourage the countries to distort their information to the ECB so that its policy could be 
oriented according to their specific objectives. For instance, by overestimating the extent of 
its demand shock, a country can allow to avoid the compensation of shocks’ effects at the 
aggregate level of the  Union. This is indeed the only means for  a country to  generate a 
stabilization effort from the Central Bank in order to stabilize its national variables
4. 
So  far,  very  few  studies  have  discussed  the  European  policy-mix  in  a  case  of 
asymmetrical information. Their main conclusion points out the lack of effectiveness of a 
decentralized system collecting economic and financial information on account of the Union 
countries  being  inclined  to  modify  their  information  in  order  to  influence  the  ECB’s 
decisions. This lack of effectiveness is however linked with heterogeneities existing within 
the EMU either at the level of the policy-makers objectives (Crettez (1998)) or at the level of 
economic shocks (Bottazzi and Manasse (2005), Duchassaing and Koessler (2004)). Inexact 
information provided by the governments may generate an inflation and public deficit bias as 
well as an excessively restrictive monetary policy and recession bias (Bottazzi and Manasse 
(1998, 2005)).  
Based on the literature on the subject, this paper aims at further exploring the issue by 
analysing  the  impact  of  asymmetrical  information  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  economic 
policies  within  a  heterogeneous  monetary  Union.  As  the  country  members  have  private 
information  on  their  specific  shocks,  we  want  to  point  out  the  governments’  interest  in 
                                                 
1 See Dixit and Lambertini (2001), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 1999), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Chari and 
Kehoe (1998), Dornbusch (1997), Villieu (2003). 
2 See Uhlig (2002), Mundschenk and Von Hagen (2003), Beetsma et al. (2001), Engwerda et al. (2002). 
3 This issue is currently put forward by the accusations against Greece which has been suspected of having 
falsified its statistics relative to its public deficit and its public debt for 2009. In fact, in the last few years, in 
addition to the Greek case, the European Commission has also questioned the quality of Italy’s and Portugal’s 
economic and financial statistics. Because of such irregularities, in February 2010 the Commission proposed a 
reform of the system controlling the reliability of the economic statistics provided by the European countries. 
4 In a monetary Union, the single monetary policy doesn’t take into account the national asymmetric shocks 
since their effects are compensated at the aggregate level.   2 
changing this private information that will then be provided to the Central Bank. Several 
questions will thus be addressed: which are the mechanisms accounting for the governments 
changing their statistical data? Is this behaviour systematic? Does the Central Bank have the 
means to discipline the governments and prevent them from providing modified data
5? In 
other words, we analyse the reliability of the subsidiarity principle, currently used in the 
EMU, in collecting statistical data. 
The second section of the paper presents the model and the third section analyses the 
incentives of the governments to distort the information transmitted to the Central Bank. A 
distinction will be made between the existence or not of a type of informational cooperation 
game between the countries of the Union. 
 
2. The model 
We use a static Keynesian model within a closed monetary Union with two countries (i, 
j ). The macroeconomic equilibria are described by demand and supply functions and we 
consider  that  the  heterogeneity  of  the  Union  concerns  both  the  mechanisms  of  monetary 
policy transmission and the economic shocks affecting the Union members (Oros (2008)). All 
the variables (except the interest rate) are expressed in logarithms. Thus the demand function 
is represented by a standard IS function, often used in the literature: 
  i i j i i r bg ag y e d + - + =          where      1 0 < < a    ;     1 < b  ;    0 > d                           (1) 
i y  and  i g  stand for the output (as deviation from the natural output) and the budget deficit 
respectively of the country i;  j g  represents the budget deficit of the country  j ; r  represents 
the short-term interest rate;  i e  the demand shock specific to the country  i with zero mean 
and  finite  variance 
2
d
i e s .  The  demand  shocks  ( i e ,  j e )  are  independent  random  variables 
whose density functions are expressed by normal distributions with zero mean. 
The national demand of the country  i depends positively on its national budget deficit 
according to a sensitivity bellow the unit ( 1 < a ) because of the crowding out effect, and 
depends negatively on the interest rate according to sensitivity  d . At the same time, the 
national  output  of  the  country  i  is  influenced  by  the  budget  deficit  of  the  other  Union 
member in a proportion b . The sign of the parameter b  can be positive or negative according 
to whether it is the output channel or the common interest rate channel respectively that play 
the  major  part  in  the  transmission  of  the  fiscal  spillovers.  Finally,  the  national  output  is 
influenced by a specific demand shock. 
Since  the  heterogeneity  of  the  Union  concerns  the  mechanisms  of  monetary  policy 
transmission,  the  parameter  d   is  specific  to  each  country.  If  we  represent  the  degree  of 
heterogeneity  between  countries  by  a  coefficient  h  ( 1 0 < < h ),  then  d d ) 1 ( h i + =   and 
d d ) 1 ( h j - = ,  where  d   stands  for  the  average  impact  of  the  monetary  policy  on  the 
economic  activity  of  the  countries  i  and  j .  Therefore,  if  0 = h ,  the  countries  will  be 
perfectly  homogeneous  in  terms  of  monetary  policy  transmission  mechanisms  ( j i d d = ), 
whereas, if  1 = h , the heterogeneity between the two countries attains its maximum degree, 
                                                 
5 The simplest way for the Central Bank to be sure of the reliability of the statistical data would be to directly 
take part in their collection. Nevertheless, the current institutional framework of the Euro zone doesn’t allow for 
this possibility. As a matter of fact, it is very unlikely that the situation changes in the immediate future. Indeed, 
a centralized collection of the statistical data could be seen by the countries as a loss of their independence and 
as a sign of lack of confidence in their capacity of collecting and communicating reliable data. These effects can 
affect the EMU’s cohesion.    3 
as  the  monetary  policy  influences  exclusively  and  with  a  maximum  impact  the  national 
demand of the country i ( d d 2 = i  et  0 = j d ). 
Regarding the supply equation, we use a Lucas function. We consider that the expected 
inflation is zero as we are only investigating the issue of the macroeconomic stabilization and 
therefore leave aside any questions of credibility.  
  i i y   m p =            where   0 > m                                                                                     (2) 
i p  represents the inflation of the country  i. For any variable x, we define the aggregate 
component,  ( ) 2 / j i x x x + =   and  the  difference  component,  ( ) 2 / j i x x x - = .  Regarding 
shocks,  we  consider  e   and  e   which  stand  for  symmetric  and  asymmetric  shocks 
respectively.  
Having described the macroeconomic equilibria, we will now analyse the behaviour of 
the policy-makers. The Central bank decides on the single monetary policy independently, 
using its interest rate as a policy instrument in order to minimize its loss function (
M L ). The 
Central Bank is mainly interested in price stabilization at the aggregate level of the Union 
(with a weight  0 b ), but also in the interest rate smoothing (with a weight  2 b ).
6  







M b p b + =              where         0 b  , 2 b  > 0                                                (3) 
The governments are in charge of the implementation of the fiscal policies using the 
budget deficit as a policy instrument. Their aim is to minimize a loss function (
G
i L ) which 
depends on the evolution of national output and budget deficit (the relative weight of these 
objectives is  1 a  et de  2 a  respectively). 








i g y L a a + =            where        1 a  ,  2 a > 0                                                    (4) 
We will first present the values of the policy instruments in a complete information game; 
we  will  then  use  these  values  to  identify  the  macroeconomic  equilibrium  in  a  case  of 
asymmetrical information. The players observe the shocks affecting the member countries 
before the beginning of the simultaneous and non cooperative game (Nash equilibrium). The 
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= z  ,  ) 1 )( ( 1 2 z b a a D - + + = a a ,  ) ( 1 2 b a a C - + = a a  
The equations (5) show that for a specific demand shock, the stabilization efforts made by 
the governments affected by this shock and by the Central bank converge. For instance, in the 
case of a negative demand shock affecting the country  i, its government and the Central 
Bank will adopt an expansionary policy; the public deficit will rise while the interest rate will 
go down in order to encourage the demand and to boost the activity.
8  
                                                 
6 The target values of the macroeconomic variables in the policy-makers’ loss functions are normalized to zero. 
7 The complete equations are available upon request. 
8 In the case of symmetric shocks, the convergence of stabilization efforts concerns all the public authorities (the 
governments and the Central Bank). Moreover, when  1 = z , the Central Bank is not constrained in using its 
policy instrument and it manages to perfectly absorb the impact of the symmetric shocks.  
(5)   4 
Moreover, it can be noticed that the Central Bank’s reaction is determined by the average 
demand  shock  of  the  Union.  Consequently,  if  the  demand  shocks  are  asymmetric,  each 
government may be inclined to overestimate their shocks so that the Central Bank should 
adapt its monetary policy in favour of each government’s specific objective. 
 
3. Governments’ strategic communication of private information 
We examine the case of an incomplete information game which means that there is an 
information gap between the players. The asymmetrical information hypothesis corresponds 
to the current institutional context of the EMU where the governments are in possession of 
private information about their own economic shocks. The game configuration will therefore 
be a Bayesian game in which each player knows the density function of the shocks. The 
governments’  and  the  Central  Bank’s  decisions  are  taken  simultaneously  and  non-
cooperatively. 
In order to better take into consideration the institutional framework of the Euro zone, we 
consider that each government accepts ex-ante to inform the Central Bank about the exact 
nature and extent of their national shocks. Formally, this commitment of the government  i 
writes  :  i i e q =  where  i q  represents the message transmitted by the government  i to ECB 
when the shock  i e  occurs. After this stage, the simultaneous game will be put into place and 
each player’s optimal decisions will be identified.  
We will point out the governments’ incentive to fail to their commitments and to transmit 
a distorted message ( i q  where  i i e q ¹ ) to the Central Bank. We will distinguish between two 
cases: on the one hand the countries have access to their partners’ private information, on the 
other hand the countries are aware merely of their own shocks. 
 
3.1. Informational cooperation between governments 
We consider that contrary to the Central Bank, the governments have exact information 
about the specific shocks affecting the Union’s country members. This configuration can be 
associated to a form of informational cooperation between governments which authorize each 
other access to their private information. A new game equilibrium is achieved if we consider 
the hypothesis put forward so far and the fact that the country  i tries to deviate unilaterally 
from its commitment. Therefore, the Central Bank determines its interest rate according to 
the information about the economic shocks provided by the two governments ( i q  and  j e ).  
The equilibrium values of macroeconomic variables (see equations A1 in Appendix) will 
be introduced in the government  i’ s loss function (
G
i L ). If we minimize this loss function 
relative to  i q , we obtain the optimum message provided by the country i: 
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According to the same principle, we obtain the optimum message provided to the Central 
Bank by the country  j : 
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  Given  the  governments’  optimum  messages  we  may  conclude  that  they  will  be 
systematically tempted to bias these messages whatever the parameters of the model and 
whatever the nature (symmetrical or asymmetrical) or the extent of the shocks affecting the 
Union’s countries. 
(6) 
(7)   5 
At the same time, we can notice that the governments’ temptation to bias their messages 
to the Central Bank consists of three elements that we will analyse in order to further detail 
the description of the fiscal authorities’ behaviour. 














concerns the symmetric shocks and is identical for the two countries. We can notice that the 
governments will be all the more tempted to lie as the Central Bank will be more interested in 
the interest rate smoothing ( 2 b  rises) to the detriment of stabilizing inflation ( 0 b  goes down). 
In  other  words,  given  that  the  governments  and  the  Central  Bank’s  stabilization  efforts 
converge in stabilizing the symmetric shocks, if the Central Bank’s activism diminishes, the 
governments  will  be  tempted  to  compensate  for  the  Central  Bank’s  loss  of  interest  in 
stabilization and will therefore overestimate the extent of their shocks.  
The second element accounting for the governments’ information manipulation is still 
concerned  with  symmetric  shocks  but  it  functions  differently  for  the  two  countries 
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) as it is based on the Union’s structural heterogeneity (h). 
If the degree of heterogeneity (h) between the countries rises, the country i ( j )
9 will be less 
(more) inclined to deform its message provided to the Central Bank. This attitude can be 
accounted for by the same situation as in the first case: as the stabilization efforts made by the 
Central  Bank  and  the  countries  directly  affected  by  the  demand  shocks  converge,  the 
governments will bias their information to make up for a potential loss of effectiveness in the 
monetary policy stabilization’ s effects. Indeed, if the heterogeneity of the Union increases 
(h rises) then the single monetary policy will have a high (low) influence on the country  i 
( j ) and the Central bank’s stabilization efforts will be more efficiently transmitted to the 
country  i to the detriment of the country  j . Therefore, the two countries communication 
strategies will be oriented differently as long as h is rising: the country i will be less and less 
interested in manipulating its message to the Central Bank since the latter takes in charge a 
growing part of its stabilization needs. On the contrary, the country  j  will try to make up for 
the lower stabilization effects of the single monetary policy by gradually overestimating its 
shock.  
The third element playing a part in the governments’ distorting their messages to the 
Central Bank ( [ ] )) ( (         1 2 b a a h C z
D
+ + ± a a
) is explained by the existence of asymmetric shocks 
in the Union. With the shocks asymmetries between the two countries growing bigger, each 
government will be more tempted to overestimate their specific shocks so that the ECB be 
more sensitive to their macroeconomic environment over their neighbours’. There is however 
an exception from this general rule in the case of country  j  when a high degree of structural 
heterogeneity (high  h) is associated with positive fiscal spillovers ( 0 > b )
10. Indeed, when 
the  shocks  are  asymmetric,  the  ECB  may  well  favour  the  country  j ’s  objective  to  the 
detriment of the country i, if the country  j  distorts its information. In order to make up for 
                                                 
9 A sufficient condition to guarantee these mechanisms is  b a > . It is a rather restrictive condition, implying 
that the fiscal spillovers can’t be superior, in absolute value, to the sensitivity of the demand to the national 
public deficit.  
10 Formally, this exception occurs when  0 )) ( ( 1 2 < + + - b a a h C a a  which is satisfied if h is high and  0 > b .   6 
the counter-productive effects of the single monetary policy, the country  i has to have a 
fiscal  policy  all  the  more  reactive  since  h  is  high  (the  monetary  policy  affects  more 
effectively the country  i). Therefore, when  b  is positive, the country  j  suffers from the 
destabilization effects of the reactive fiscal policy conducted by its neighbour. These effects 
may  cancel  the  monetary  policy’s  stabilizing  effects  (whose  transmission  effectiveness  is 
slowed down if  h is high), which explains why the country  j  is less inclined to modifying 
its message to the Central Bank. This mechanism doesn’t occur if the fiscal spillovers are 
negative ( 0 < b ) no matter how high the Union’s structural heterogeneities are. In this case, 
the neighbour’s fiscal policy has a stabilizing effect on the country  j , which will be thus 
more inclined to bias its message. 
 
3. 2. Asymmetrical information between governments 
We consider that the governments are aware only of their shocks and do not have any 
information about their partners’ shock. In this game configuration, the equilibrium occurs 
under the same principles as previously, knowing that to fix their optimum fiscal policies the 
governments  minimize  their  expected  loss  functions  ([ ] 0 ) ( = ¶ ¶ i
G
i g L E   and 
[ ] 0 ) ( = ¶ ¶ j
G
j g L E ).  
If we introduce the equilibrium values of the output and the public deficit (see equations 
A2 in the Appendix) in the governments’ loss functions (
G
i L  and 
G
j L ), the optimum messages 
for the countries i and  j  respectively write: 
 





=  and 





=                                                                                (8) 
These  optimum  government  messages  reveal  the  same  mechanisms  of  strategic 
communication as in the previous case: the country  i ( j ) is more (less) inclined to inform 
the Central Bank about the real nature of its own shock as the structural heterogeneity inside 
the Union is reinforced (h goes up). 
The most important element put forward by the analysis of the expression (8) is that, 
contrary to the previous case, the two governments are no longer systematically tempted to 
distort their private information. We can notice that the revealing equilibrium (when the two 
governments announce their true shocks to the Central Bank) occurs if the Central Bank is 
not constrained in using its interest rate ( 1 = z ) and if the Union is structurally homogeneous 
( 0 = h ). Indeed, for a maximum level of monetary activism, the governments no longer have 
a reason to overestimate their specific shocks if they do not know their neighbours’ situation 
and have all the same benefits from the Central Bank’s stabilization efforts. This stabilization 
mechanism  didn’t  appear  in  the  previous  case  (the  governments  were  aware  of  their 
neighbours’ shocks) since, even if  1 = z  and  0 = h , the governments were equally tempted to 
lie if the shocks affecting the Union members were asymmetric. In this case, the governments 
know that the Central Bank has to divide its stabilization efforts between the two asymmetric 
shocks and, as a result, they overestimate their own shocks in order to be able to benefit best 
from the Central Bank’s stabilization action.  
This result has a main drawback which is the relatively restrictive hypothesis on which it 
is based:  1 = z  and  0 = h . Nevertheless, even if the two hypothesis are less strict, there is still 
a  revealing  equilibrium  within  the  Union,  which  underlines  the  specificity  of  this 
informational game configuration compared with the previous one. Thus, when the Central 
Bank is constrained in the use of its interest rate ( 1 < z ), it is possible to identify a revealing 
equilibrium  for  the  country  i  if  there  are  structural  heterogeneities  within  the  Union   7 
( 0 ¹ h )
11.  Indeed,  the  country  i  can  be  disciplined  by  the  existence  of  structural 
heterogeneities because it benefits from a more efficient transmission of the monetary policy 
effects allowing it to compensate from the Central Bank’s lower reactivity in stabilizing the 
macroeconomic  variables  ( 1 < z ).  On  the  contrary,  for  the  country  j ,  the  revealing 
equilibrium cannot be reached if  1 ¹ z  or  0 ¹ h . Indeed, even if the Central Bank is ready to 
maximize its efforts to stabilize the macroeconomic variables ( 1 = z ), the country  j  will still 
be  tempted  to  overestimate  its  shock  since  it  can’t  take  a  maximum  advantage  from  the 
Central Bank’s stabilization efforts ( 0 ¹ h ). 
On the whole, we can conclude that the lack of information about the partner’s economic 
environment  can  discipline  the  governments  and  dissuades  them  to  provide  distorted 
messages to the Central Bank. In other words, a centralized system of statistical information 
with the Central Bank taking an active part in collecting the statistical data is not the only 
solution to prevent the governments’ incentives to manipulate the information.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analysed the impact in terms of macroeconomic stabilization of a 
form of asymmetrical information between the countries of a heterogeneous monetary Union. 
Considering the heterogeneity of the Union both with respect to the mechanisms of monetary 
policy transmission and to the nature of the shocks affecting the Union members, we have 
assumed that the countries have private information about their specific shocks. We have thus 
examined if the governments are inclined to take advantage of this information gap in order 
to influence indirectly the Central Bank in its choice of monetary policy. 
We have proved that the governments are always inclined to distort their messages to the 
Central Bank if they develop a form of cooperation by sharing their information on their 
specific shocks. This configuration can be seen as a coalition between the governments that 
are interested in lying to the Central Bank in order to improve their national welfare whatever 
the nature and the extent of the economic shocks and whatever the degree of the Union’s 
structural heterogeneity. Therefore, as long as the Union members have this informational 
advantage over the Central Bank, the latter has no means to persuade the governments to 
provide it with the real information about their specific shocks.  
On the contrary, the Central Bank will be able to discipline the governments which won’t 
be interested in giving distorted information if there is a perfect informational asymmetry 
within  the  Union,  that  is  the  countries  have  no  longer  access  to  their  partners’  private 
information.  With  the  Central  Bank’s  commitment  to  perfectly  stabilize  the  Union’s 
symmetric  shocks  and  with  the  mechanisms  of  monetary  policy  transmission  being 
homogeneous between the countries, the governments will lose the incentive to distort the 
national  statistical  data.  Moreover,  according  to  our  results,  even  if  the  countries  are 
structurally heterogeneous and the Central Bank is constrained in the use of its monetary 
policy instrument, the asymmetrical information between governments represents a second 
best solution as it disciplines the behaviour of one country member which is the country most 
affected by the single monetary policy effects.  
Concerning the institutional framework of the EMU, this mechanism, which allows to 
achieve a revealing equilibrium, is compatible with the current principle of subsidiarity in 
collecting statistical data, a principle which is unlikely to be banned at least not in the near 
future.  
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Appendix  
In  the  case  of  informational  cooperation  between  governments,  the  aggregate  and 
difference component of public deficit and output write:  
     [ ] j i i z z
D
a
g e q e
a
) 1 (
1 - + - - =  
     ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] j i i zh D b a a zh zh b a a D
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a
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In the case of asymmetrical information between governments, the equilibrium values of 
national output and public deficit write: 
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where   ( )( ) [ ] h b a z a a - + - + = A 1 1 2 a a      ,     ( )( ) [ ] h b a z a a + + - + = B 1 1 2 a a  
(A1) 
(A2) 